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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
:
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS;
and P and F FOOD SERVICES,
Defendants/Appellants.

CaseNo.20080287-SC

:
:

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0') (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The district court held that the defendants did not own a right to view.1 This
appurtenant easement had been sold to Utah's Department of Transportation (UDOT) by
prior owners of the property in question. R. 340, 342, 396. Because defendants failed to

1

The right to view (an appurtenant easement) protects the right to the view out
from a property to the adjacent public road. The alleged right to visibility claims a
protected right of a property to be viewed by those on an adjacent public road.
-l-

raise the issue in their opening brief, they have waived their right to challenge this
holding of the district court.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is
unique to this Court and does not entail review of the district court's decision.
2. The district court's determination, on remand, that the defendants did not own
an appurtenant easement of view is not contrary to the law of the case. This Court's prior
decision did not consider whether the defendants owned an easement of view.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by defendants in their
response to UDOT's motion in limine. R. 358-59. The district court considered this issue
and rejected it. R. 392.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the trial court properly complied, on
remand, with our decision . . . is a question of law which we review for correctness."
Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1995).
3. UDOT has the statutory right to reduce the amount of property included in its
taking. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-512(2) (West Supp. 2008). The district court correctly
permitted UDOT to amend its taking so as to not seek condemnation of an easement of
view where the defendants did not own such a right.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised below by UDOT. R.403.
The district court considered this issue and granted UDOT's motion in limine, in part, for
this reason. R. 469-70.

-2-

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where a motion in limine is granted based on the
district court's legal conclusions, the decision is reviewed for correctness. UDOTv.
Ivers, 2005 UT App 519, f9,128 P.3d 74, aff d in part and remanded. Ivers v. UDOT.
2007 UT 19, 154P.3d802.
4. In their opening brief, defendants ask this Court to alter the date set by statute
for measuring their entitlement to compensation for their condemned property. This issue
was not raised below, and they cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. Because this issue was not raised below, the
district court did not consider it.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not
entail review of the district court's decision.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 20, 2002, UDOT initiated this action to condemn a .048-acre strip
along the side and front of the defendants' property. R 1-12. In their answer, the
defendants alleged that they were entitled to severance damages for the impact of the
condemnation on the remaining property. R. 25. On March 14, 2003, UDOT filed a
motion in limine asking the district court to preclude the defendants from introducing
evidence at trial of severance damages, including damages for alleged loss of the right to
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view and visibility. R. 42-67. On May 30, 2003, the district court granted UDOT's
motion as to view and visibility. R. 150-61.
Defendants' first effort to appeal the district court's ruling was dismissed without
prejudice on May 14, 2004 by the Utah Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for
lack ofjurisdiction because the challenged ruling was not eligible for certification as a
final order pursuant to Utah R Civ. P. Rule 54(b). R. 224-227.
The parties then stipulated as to all other issues in the action and a final judgment
was entered on March 1,2005. R. 240-48. The stipulation and judgment expressly
preserved the defendants' right to appeal the district court's ruling on UDOT's motion in
limine. R. 242, 246. The challenged ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
UDOT v. Ivers, 2005 UT App 519,103 P.3d 699. This Court granted the defendants'
petition for certiorari as to the following issue:
Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims
for compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation of
evidence of damages, arising from an alleged easement for view or
visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused by
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property.
R.271.
On February 6, 2007, this Court ruled that there was no protectable property
interest in visibility, but that an easement for view could be damaged by construction
beyond the boundaries of the landowners' property if the use of the condemned portion of
the property was essential to the completion of the project as a whole. Ivers v. UDOT,
2007 UT 19, U125-26, 154 P.3d 802. Remittitur was issued on March 2, 2007. R. 290.
-4-

On May 2, 2007, UDOT filed a second motion in limine. R. 314-47. The motion
was based on the fact that UDOT had already purchased the appurtenant easements,
including that of view, from previous owners of the defendants' property. R. 323-24.
The district court treated UDOT's motion in limine as a motion to amend its
complaint. R. 386-99. While finding that the defendants would not be prejudiced (R.
395), the district court denied the motion as being untimely. R. 395-96. However, the
district court ruled that the defendants' predecessors in interest had sold their appurtenant
easement of view to UDOT. R. 396.
UDOT moved the district court to alter or amend its order. R. 400-24. The court
granted this motion, reversing its prior decision denying UDOT's motion in limine. R.
463-72. The court expressly ruled that the defendants did not own an appurtenant
easement of view. R. 470. A final order to this effect was entered on March 20, 2008. R.
473.476. The defendants filed their notice of appeal on April 2, 2008. R. 488-89.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The improvements to U.S. 89 that are the subject of this litigation are the most
recent in a series of construction projects at the same site. 1.34 acres of the property now
owned by the defendants was purchased by UDOT in 1964. The warranty deed expressly
included the landowners5 appurtenant easements as part of the sale:
To enable the grantee to construct and maintain a public highway as
an expressway,... the grantors hereby release and relinquish to the grantee
any and all rights or easements appurtenant to the grantors remaining
property bv reason of the location thereof with reference to said highway.
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including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress to or egress
from the grantors remaining property to or from said highway.
R. 328 (emphasis added).
The only exception was a limited right of access retained by the owners, but no
easement of view. Part of this limited right of access was then purchased from the
property owners in 1971. R. 336-38. In 1992, a further .247 acre of the property was
purchased by UDOT. The warranty deed again included the landowners' appurtenant
easements as part of the sale:
To enable the Utah Department of Transportation to construct and
maintain a public highway as an expressway,... the Owners of said entire
tract of property hereby release and relinquish to said Utah Department of
Transportation any and all rights or easements appurtenant to the remaining
property of said Owners by reason of the location thereof with reference to
said highway, including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress
to or egress from the grantors remaining property contiguous to the lands
conveyed, to or from said highway.
R. 340, 342 (emphasis added).
Reviewing these deeds, the district court held that they unambiguously conveyed
all of the appurtenant rights or easements to UDOT:
[I]t is clear from the language of the two deeds that Arby's predecessors in
interest intended to convey those appurtenant rights. "[T]he main object in
construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that
of the grantor, from the language used." Hartman v. Potter, et al., 596 P.2d
653, 656 (Utah 1979) (emphasis in original). If a deed's language is plain
and unambiguous, "parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms . . . "
and "the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation
only when words used are ambiguous." IdL
Just as this Court finds that the language used in the Condemnation
Resolution meant that UDOT sought to condemn all of the rights
appurtenant to the parcel, the language used in the 1961 and 1992 deeds,
-6-

which is almost identical to the language used in the Condemnation
Resolution, meant that the grantor intended to convey "any and all rights or
easements appurtenant to the remaining property of said Owners... [.]"
The language used was not ambiguous, and the intentions of the parties is
[sic] therefore not open to interpretation. Arby's predecessors in interest
intended to convey the appurtenant rights of the remaining parcel.
R. 396.
In its ruling on UDOT's motion to alter or amend, the district court granted
UDOT's motion in limine. The court explained that UDOT could introduce the deeds to
show that the defendants did not own a right to view and defendants would be precluded
from submitting any evidence that they owned such a right. R. 470.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants have never owned an appurtenant easement of view. When they
purchased their property, that right had already been sold to UDOT. The district court
expressly held that the defendants' predecessors in interest had unambiguously deeded
their easement of view to UDOT. The defendants have not challenged this ruling on
appeal. Instead, they ask this Court to procedurally require UDOT to purchase the
easement, again, from the defendants (by means of severance damages). This the district
court refused to do, and that decision should be affirmed.
The district court correctly held that UDOT had the statutory right to change the
amount of property it was taking at any time. Defendants have failed to articulate a
contrary interpretation of the statute.
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For the first time on appeal, defendants ask this Court to adjust the date of
valuation of the property. Defendants cannot raise a new issue for the first time on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE
DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION THAT THEY HAVE NO RIGHT
TO VIEW BY NOT RAISING IT IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF
The district court held that the defendants did not own a right to view. It found
that the prior owners of the property in question had sold that right to UDOT. R. 396,
470. The appurtenant right of view, as discussed in Utah State Road Commission v.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), is companion to, and derivative of, the easement for
physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the
land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights forming part of the
owner's estate." Miva, 526 P.2d at 928.2 The district court expressly held that "Arby's
predecessors in interest intended to convey the appurtenant rights of the remaining
parcel." R. 396.
Defendants did not challenge this holding in their opening brief. By failing to do
so, they have waived their right to raise this issue now. Where defendants do not analyze
an issue in their opening brief, this Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown. 853

2

"An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just
compensation." Id. at 929.
-8-

P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992). Nor can they now raise it in their reply brief. "[I]t is well
settled that 'issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the
opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.5"
Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 2001 UT 75,1fl0 n.l, 31 P.3d 543.
Defendants have failed to challenge the district court's holding that they do not
possess a right to view. Because the defendants do not have a right of view, the district
court correctly precluded them from presenting evidence of damages caused by an alleged
loss of view. This decision should be affirmed on appeal.
II. THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION DID NOT DETERMINE
WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD A RIGHT OF VIEW
On remand, the district court granted UDOT's motion in limine, which it treated as
a motion to amend the complaint. The motion was based on the fact that the defendants
could not seek damages for loss of view from their property because they did not possess
such a right. The right had been sold to UDOT by prior owners of the property.
Defendants ask this Court to reject the district court's holding that they did not own a
right to view on the ground that it was contrary to the law of the case set out in this
Court's prior decision. Brief of Appellants at 14-15.
The district court correctly determined that it could permit an amendment of the
pleadings (raising a new argument) so long as the new issue was not foreclosed by this
Court's decision. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180,181 (Utah 1986) ("the
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pleadings may be amended after remand within the sound discretion of the trial court so
long as they do not cover issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court.").
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is affirmed or reversed
and remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial court
may not permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to try
rights already settled. This rule is not only reasonable, but necessary, if
litigation is ever to come to an end. After an appellate court has once ruled
upon issues presented to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it considers the ruling
erroneous.
But where the entire case is not settled by the appellate tribunal
where certain issues are left open by its judgment or decree, the trial court
ordinarily has discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as to
those matters which have been left open.
Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct. 191 P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1948) (citation omitted).
The issue before this Court on defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari was
whether a property owner could present evidence of damages "arising from an alleged
easement for view or visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused by
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property." R. 271. This Court
held that no easement of visibility existed under Utah law. Ivers v. UDOT. 2007 UT 19,
ffl[12-15, 154P.3d802.
This Court also held that severance damages for a loss of view could be recovered
"when the view-impairing structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but
the condemned land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to
completion of the project." Id. at ^[26. This Court did not address the question of whether
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the defendants possessed a right to view. That issue was not raised before this Court and
certiorari was not granted to consider it.
In Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank FSB. 2008 UT 69,3 this Court ruled that a
Utah cause of action was preempted by federal regulations. Id, 2008 UT 69 at ff 21-23.
This was so even though a prior decision of this Court in that action had held that the
Utah cause of action existed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at ffl[67. Though the federal regulation that preempted the state cause of action had been cited
to the court in the prior appeal, the issue of preemption was not considered and the law of
the case did not preclude the defendant from raising it on remand.
When reviewing a decision made on one ground, we have the discretion to
affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is apparent in the record.
But that cannot mean, as the Madsens' contend here, that our declining to
rule on an alternative ground can be construed as a ruling on the merits of
the alternative ground, particularly when the alternative ground has not
been argued by either party to the appeal. In fact, we frequently decline to
rule on an issue when it has not been fully briefed by the parties because
full briefing allows this court to carefully consider fully developed and
supported arguments. The decision not to reach an alternative ground is
certainly not binding on the court below, particularly when the parties did
not argue the issue and this court's decision does not include so much as a
single reference to the issue now supposedly foreclosed.
Idatt26.
Whether the defendants were entitled to severance damages was an issue left for
the district court to determine on remand. The district court ruled on an issue that had
been left open by this Court's decision. This Court's opinion did not foreclose UDOT

3

A copy is attached as Addendum B.
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from raising the fact that it had already purchased all appurtenant easements, including
the right to view, from previous owners of defendants' property. Neither party briefed
this issue on the prior appeal. The question was not presented to this Court. The district
court did not err in deciding this separate issue. The district court's decision should be
affirmed.
III. UDOT, BY LAW, CAN REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF
PROPERTY THAT IT SEEKS TO CONDEMN
By its motion in limine, UDOT sought to prevent the defendants from seeking
damages for their alleged loss of view. In essence, the motion sought to reduce the
amount of property UDOT was seeking by not condemning the defendants' right to view.
The motion was based on the fact that the defendants did not own any such appurtenant
easement. The district court held that UDOT, by statute, was permitted to reduce the
amount of property that it sought to acquire. The statute provides:
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages
in its assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the
service of summons, the plaintiff:
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-512(2) (West Supp. 2008).
Defendants claim that the district court misinterpreted this statute, but fail to
suggest the correct interpretation. Brief of Appellants at 15-20. The primary goal of
courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent as evidenced by
the plain language of the statute. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f25, 4 P.3d 795 ("We need
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look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity."). Defendants have not
claimed that the statute is ambiguous.
The plain language of Subsection 2 permits the reduction of damages if UDOT
reduces the amount of property that it actually takes. UDOT's motion eliminated the
appurtenant easement of view from the amount of property that UDOT was condemning.
With this change, the district court correctly held that severance damages for loss of view
were no longer recoverable by the defendants.
IV. DEFENDANTS CANNOT CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL THAT THE DATE OF VALUATION OF THEIR
PROPERTY SHOULD BE CHANGED
"For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right to
compensation and damages shall be considered to have accrued at the date of the service
of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all
property to be actually taken

" Utah Ctfde Ann. § 78B-6-512(l) (West Supp. 2008).

In their opening brief, defendants ask this Court to change the date for measuring their
damages from the date the summons was served to "a current date." Brief of Appellants
at 20-21. Defendants argue that this should be done because of the alleged delay caused
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by UDOT's "shifting theories."4 Brief of Appellants at 20. This issue was not raised in
the district court. Only before this Court have the defendants made this claim.
In Rspinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of E d u c 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider the claim,
this Court explained that
Appellants' first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this
claim.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule deal with cases
in which the appellant demonstrates that "the trial court committed plain error or
exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18
(Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted).
Defendants could have raised this issue below. Having failed to do so, they cannot
do so now, particularly where they have not briefed the question of whether plain error or
other exceptional circumstances exist that would warrant its consideration for the first
time on appeal. Where the defendants did not analyze an issue in their opening brief, this
Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992).

4

Defendants' claim for damages due to loss of their right to view was denied by
the district court on May 30, 2003, just over five months after the filing of this action.
The issue was not revived until this Court's opinion of February 6, 2007. UDOT's
motion in limine at issue in this appeal was filed less than three months after this Court's
Opinion.
-14-

CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the decision of
the district court.
DATED this ^-~ y

day of September, 2008.

7^J' A

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM "A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES & RULES
78B-6-512. Damages — When right has accrued — Mitigation or reduction —
Improvements.
(1) For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right to compensation
and damages shall be considered to have accrued at the date of the service of summons,
and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where damages are allowed, as provided in Section 78B-6-511.
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in its
assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the service of summons, the
plaintiff:
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken.
(3) Improvements put upon the property by the property owner subsequent to the date
of service of summons may not be included in the assessment of compensation or
damages.

ADDENDUM "B

Wssttevu
- - - P. 3d
- - - P.3d

Page 1
, 2008 WL 4299622

( U t a h ) , 2008 UT 69

HMadsen v. Washington Mut. Bank fsb
Utah,2008.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED,
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED,
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, for themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK FSB, (successor to
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association),
Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant.
No. 20060597.

*1 T| 1 In 1964, Richard and Nancy Madsen financed the
purchase of their home by borrowing money from
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association
("Prudential") under a real estate mortgage contract. The
contract obligated the Madsens to make monthly payments
into an account held by Prudential for the purpose of
paying taxes and insurance premiums. Prudential paid no
interest or earnings on the running account balance. The
Madsens sued, seeking interest on their account. This case
requires us to decide whether the Madsens may recover,
on a common law accounting theory, profits that
Prudential and its successor, Washington Mutual Bank
("WAMU") may have earned from the use of the funds, or
whether federal law preempts the Madsens' claim. We
hold that federal law preempts the Madsens* claim.

BACKGROUND
% 2 This is the third appeal before us in the protracted
history of this case, which was initiated more than thirty
years ago. And although we have twice ruled in this case
on appeal, our analysis of the issues requires a full
explanation of the facts and procedural history.

Sept. 23, 2008.

Third District, Salt Lake; No. 750226073; The Honorable
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K 3 The facts forming the basis for the Madsens' claim are
not in dispute. In 1964, the Madsens borrowed money
from Prudential to finance the purchase of their home. The
standard form trust deed used by Prudential required the
Madsens, as trustors, to make monthly "budget payments"
into an account held by Prudential, the trustee and
beneficiary of the trust deed:

In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said
note the TRUSTOR agrees to pay to the beneficiary,
upon the same day each month, budget payments
estimated to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes and
insurance premiums; said budget payments to be
adjusted from time to time as required, and said budget
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payments are hereby pledged to the BENEFICIARY as
additional security for the full performance of this deed
of trust and the note secured hereby. The budget
payments so accumulated may be withdrawn by the
BENEFICIARY for the payment of taxes or insurance
premiums due on the premises. The BENEFICIARY
may at any time, without notice, apply said budget
payments to the payment of any sums due under the
terms of this deed of trust and the note secured hereby
or either of them.

The trust deed did not contain any provision requiring
Prudential to pay interest or profits on the budget
payments, and Prudential paid none.

H 4 In 1975, the Madsens sued Prudential as the
representatives of a class of borrowers who, like the
Madsens, made budget payments to Prudential under the
terms of their trust deeds. The Madsens brought a claim
for breach of contract and sought an accounting of interest
or profits under a theory of unjust enrichment (the
"accounting claim"). The Madsens argued that Prudential
was unjustly enriched because the budget payments were
held as a pledge and the common law required Prudential,
as pledgee, to account for any profits earned through the
use of the pledge.

If 6 The district court granted summary judgment to
Prudential on its contract claim without addressing its
preemption claim. The court reasoned that "neither the
contract provisions, express or implied, the principles of
'unjust enrichment,' nor those of 'pledges' give to
plaintiffs a claim upon which relief can be granted on the
contract in question."The Madsens appealed, and we took
up the case in Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings &
LoanAss'n ("Madsen I")™ We reversed, holding that the
funds deposited under the loan agreement satisfied the
essential elements of a common law pledge: "The
essential elements of a pledge are contained in the
agreement, viz., the existence of a debt or obligation, a
transfer of property to the pledgee, to be held as security
and, if necessary, to be used to assure performance of the
obligation."—We held that the common law of pledge
required that "if from the use of [the pledge] profits are
derived, pledgee must, in the absence of a special
agreement, account for them to the pledgor." —Thus we
remanded the case to the district court to consider the
Madsens' accounting claim.

FN 1.558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977).

FN2./rf. at 1339.

FN3./</. at 1340.
*2 Tf 5 After the district court certified the class,
Prudential sought judgment as a matter of law. In separate
motions, Prudential moved the court to dismiss or grant
summary judgment in its favor. In both motions,
Prudential argued that federal law, which specifically
authorized Prudential to hold budget payments without
paying interest, preempted the Madsens' accounting claim.
Furthermore, in one of its motions, Prudential argued that
the contract, which was complete and unambiguous,
contained no provision obligating Prudential to pay
interest.

U 7 Although Prudential referred to federal banking
regulations as part of its policy argument in its appellate
brief to us, Prudential did not argue federal preemption.
Accordingly, our decision did not address federal banking
regulations or federal preemption. Nor did our decision
address the Madsens' claim for breach of contract. Instead,
we confined our decision to whether the budget payments
constituted a common law pledge.—We reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that
the budget payments were such a pledge and that the
Madsens could pursue their accounting claim. —
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at 1339-40.

FN5./rf.
% 8 Following the remand, Prudential removed the case to
federal district court, asserting, as a basis for federal
jurisdiction, that the case involved an important question
of federal law. The Madsens moved for dismissal, arguing
that the federal court lacked jurisdiction. When the federal
district court denied the Madsens' motion to dismiss, the
Madsens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in Madsen v. Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n ("Madsen II"). ^ The Tenth
Circuit reversed, holding that "Prudential's claim of
federal preemption is in the nature of a defense to the
Madsens' cause of action and cannot be the basis of
federal question jurisdiction on removal."—The case was
remanded to the state district court.—

FN6.635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.1980).

FN7.A/. at 802.

If 10 The parties proceeded to try the "test case" of
Prudential's liability. Judge Kenneth Rigtrup limited the
trial to the issue of whether Prudential earned profit from
the use of the Madsens' pledged funds and, if so, how
much. Because he narrowed the scope of the trial to this
one issue, he did not allow Prudential to present evidence
or argue in support of several defenses that it had urged.
He did not allow Prudential to argue federal preemption or
introduce evidence of a "special agreement" whereby the
parties agreed that no interest would be paid. He then
ruled in favor of the Madsens, awarding them $134.70
plus interestfromthe date ofjudgment on their individual
claim.^

¥N9.Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Saw & Loan
Ass'n. 161 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1988).

Tf 11 Prior to the trial and again prior to issuing his ruling,
Judge Rigtrup disclosed to the parties that he was a
potential class member, having financed the purchase of
his
o w n h o m e by b o r r o w i n g
from
Pmdential.^^Thirty-nine days after this ruling, Prudential
moved to disqualify Judge Rigtrup. The presiding judge
granted Prudential's motion, and the Madsens sought
permission to file an interlocutory appeal.—

FNZ.Id at 804.
FN10.M at 539-40.
*3 1f 9 On remand in the state district court, Prudential
revived the federal preemption argument in a new motion
for summary judgment. In reply, the Madsens alleged that
although we did not mention the federal preemption issue
in our ruling, we had already decided the issue in the
Madsens' favor in Madsen I. The Madsens further argued
that the issue was decided in their favor by the Tenth
Circuit in its ruling that the federal court had no
jurisdiction. After a hearing, the district court ruled
simply, "Prudential's Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon federal preemption is hereby denied," offering
no further explanation.

FN1 !./</. at 541.

% 12 We granted such permission and addressed Judge
Rigtrup's disqualification inMadsen v. Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n ("Madsen 111")?^ We held that
Prudential's motion to disqualify was not timely. — W e
also ruled that Prudential apparently acquiesced in Judge
Rigtrup's rendering a decision by failing to move for his
disqualification until thirty-nine days after his
ruling.—We concluded that Prudential's acquiescence
was evidence that it did not believe that Judge Rigtrup

® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

- - - P.3d
- - - P.3d

Page 4
, 2008 WL 4299622

( U t a h ) , 2008 UT 69

should recuse himself.— Further, we noted that although
Judge Rigtrup had personal knowledge of some of the
disputed facts and had a financial interest in the outcome
of the case, the presiding judge expressly found no actual
bias.^

trial court, now presided over by Judge L.A. Dever,
entered a judgment for that amount.

*4 f 14 The Madsens appeal, and WAMU cross-appeals.
Each asserts multiple errors. The Madsens assert that the
district court erred by

FN12.767 P.2d 538 OJtah 1988).

FN13Jtf.at543.

(1) applying a four-year statute of limitations rather than
applying a six-year statute of limitations or holding that
no limitations period applied; ^ ^

FN14.A/. at 543-44.

FN15.M

FN16.M at 544.

% 13 Following the remand, Judge Rigtrup made a number
of rulings, some of which the parties challenge in this
appeal. First, he defined the class consistent with the
Madsens' complaint as borrowers who had purchased a
"single [-]family, owner-occupied, primary residence."
This ruling excluded from the class borrowers who
financed second homes, commercial properties, and
multiplexes. Second, he ruled that the four-year statute of
limitations in Utah Code section 78-12-25(3). "for relief
not otherwise provided for by law," applied to the case.
Third, he ruled that the 1979 Interest on Mortgage Loan
Accounts Act cut off damages as of 1979. Thus, he limited
the Madsens to recovering for the period from 1971 to
1979. Fourth, he ruled that the Madsens were not entitled
to prejudgment interest but that interest during the
eight-year period would be compounded. Fifth, he
appointed a special master to locate and define the class
members and ascertain damages. The special master filed
a final report on March 1, 2002, concluding that there
were 9,547 class members, who were owed an average of
$ 105.18, resulting in a total judgment of $ 1,004,153. The

FN17. Utah Code section 78B-2-307
(Supp.2008), which the court applied, provides
that "[a]n action may be brought within four
years ... for relief not otherwise provided for by
law.'The Madsens argue that the court should
have applied the former section 78-12-34 (now
repealed), which provided that "actions [may be]
brought, to recover money or other property
deposited with any bank, trust company or
savings and loan corporation, association or
society, [without] limitation," or, in the
alternative, section 78-12-25(2) (now amended),
which provided a six-year statute of limitations
for actions founded "upon any contract,
obligation, or [for] liability founded upon an
instrument in writing."

(2) ruling that the 1979 Interest on Mortgage Loan
Accounts Act cut off damages after 1979;

(3) failing to award prejudgment interest covering the
period from 1979 to the judgment;

(4) narrowing the class to include only borrowers who
financed owner-occupied single-family homes, which
excluded borrowers who financed duplexes, second
homes, and commercial properties; and
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(5) failing to disqualify the special master because he
held ex parte meetings with WAMU and relied heavily
on the work of WAMU employees.

(2) erred by excluding evidence of a "special
agreement" between the parties that no interest be paid
on the pledged funds;

K 15 The Madsens further argue that we should simplify
the accounting of the profits earned and end the case by
ordering the district court to use the pass-book savings
rate instead of continuing the case with a newly appointed
special master.

(3) erred in certifying the class under rule 23(b)(1)(A)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: and

(4) erred in awarding compound interest during the
1971 to 1979 accounting period.

f 16 WAMU cross-appeals, asserting that the district court
U 17 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78A-3-102(3)(i) (Supp.2008).
(1) erred as a matter of law by not granting summary
judgment on the basis that federal law as codified in 12
C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) preempts the Madsens' state law
claims;^

FN 18. WAMU preserved its federal preemption
argument by making the argument to the district
court both before and after Madsen I and to the
federal district court. However, WAMU's brief in
this appeal did not include a citation to the record
showing that it had preserved this issue as
required by our rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. While we decline to
sanction WAMU under rule 24(k). we warn
future litigants that compliance with our briefing
requirements is not discretionary, and litigants
who fail to comply take the risk that we may
disregard or strike briefs or arguments. See, e.g.,
Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007
UT 2. f 23. 151 P J d 962. We decline to
disregard WAMU's preemption argument
because, despite WAMU's oversight in this
regard, it is clear that WAMU preserved the
federal preemption argument and otherwise fully
complied with the briefing requirements found in
rule 24.

ANALYSIS

f 18 In this opinion, we will first discuss the law of
preemption generally. Then, we will discuss WAMU's
argument that federal law preempts the Madsens' claim.
We will also address the Madsens' contention that both
this court and the Tenth Circuit have already decided the
preemption question in the Madsens' favor in Madsen I
and Madsen II, respectively. Because we hold that federal
regulations preempt the Madsens' claim, it is unnecessary
to reach the other issues on appeal and cross-appeal.

I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS CONFLICTING
STATE LAW

^ 19 Whether federal law preempts a state law cause of
action is a question of law.^^We review questions of law
for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the
court below.^^Under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution,— federal law preempts state law
"where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively"
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or "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law."—In either case, it does not matter whether the state
law is statutory or common law or whether the federal law
is a federal regulation or statute of Congress.—

FN 19.See Dev't of Human Servs. v. Hughes,
2007 UT 30, 1115. 156 P.3d 820: see also
Retherfordv. AT & TCommc'ns. 844 P.2d 949.
958-59 (Utah 1992).

FK20.R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells
Fargo Bank. N.A.. 2004 UT 48. T 7. 100 P.3d
1159.

FN21.U.S. Const, art. VI. cl. 2.

FN22.Enelish v. General Elec. Co.,
.496 U.S. 72.
79 (1990).

FN23.5ee Free i '. Bland.369 U.S. 663. 667-68
(1962).

U 20 In this case, WAMU has argued that the Madsens'
state law accounting claim, which requires WAMU to pay
profits earned on the Madsens' pledged funds, conflicts
with federal law as codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c).
WAMU contends that under this regulation and other
federal laws, it has no obligation to pay interest or
earnings on such accounts. If, under federal law, WAMU
has no obligation to pay interest or earnings on the
Madsens' pledged funds, federal law conflicts with, and
therefore preempts, the Madsens' state law accounting
claim.

II. UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS IN EFFECT
AT THE TIME OF THE CONTRACT, PRUDENTIAL

Page 6

HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST ON
RESERVE ACCOUNTS

*5 K 21 WAMU argues that 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c),
which exempts federal savings and loan associations from
paying interest under certain circumstances, preempts any
state law under which the Madsens might recover. That
section reads as follows:

A Federal association which makes a loan on or after
June 16, 1975, on the security of a single-family
dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the borrower
(except such a loan for which a bona fide commitment
was made before that date) shall pay interest on any
escrow account maintained in connection with such a
loan (1) if there is in effect a specific statutory provision
or provisions of the State in which such dwelling is
located by or under which the State-chartered savings
and loan associations, mutual savings banks and similar
institutions are generally required to pay interest on
such escrow accounts, and (2) at not less than the rate
required to be paid by such State-chartered institutions
but not to exceed the rate being paid by the Federal
association on its regular accounts (as defined by
Section 526.1 of this chapter). Except as provided by
contract, a Federal association shall have no obligation
to pay interest on escrow accounts apartfromthe duties
imposed by this paragraph. ^ ^

FN24.12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (1976).

f 22 Under this regulation, Prudential had no obligation to
pay interest to the Madsens absent a state statute or
contractual obligation to the contrary. The Madsens1
accounting claim is not founded on a contract or statute.
By its express terms, however, the regulation applies only
prospectively to loans made after June 16, 1975. It does
not apply to the Madsens' loan, which Prudential made in
1964. But WAMU argues that § 545.6-11(c) did not alter
the federal law applicable to the loans made before 1975.
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Rather, WAMU contends, the 1975 change merely
reaffirmed the impact of two existing regulations, which
also provide that Prudential had no obligation to pay
interest to the Madsens. —

FN25. The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
which promulgated regulations governing the
savings and loan industry beginning in 1933.

% 23 WAMU is correct. Two regulations predating the
Madsens' loan, 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.1 and 541.5, directly
conflict with the Madsens' state law cause of action. Both
regulations became part of the federal register in 1958 and
thus apply to the Madsens' 1964 loans.—Section 544.1
provides that a federal home loan association such as
Prudential "is not required to distribute earnings on
short-term savings accounts."—Section 541.5 defines
short-term savings accounts to include "a savings account
in a Federal association established for the purpose of
accumulating funds to pay taxes or insurance premiums,
or both, in connection with a loan on the security of a lien
on real estate."—The Madsens' account held by
Prudential fits this definition precisely. Therefore, the
account is subject to section 544. h which explicitly
provides that lenders who hold such accounts have no
obligation to pay interest or earnings absent an agreement
or state statute. The regulations directly conflict with the
Madsens' state law claim. Federal law, therefore, preempts
the Madsens' state law claim for interest on their account.

FN26.23 C.F.R. § 9893 (1958).

FN27.12C.F.R.S 544.1 0975).

FN28.12C.F.R.8 541.5 (1975).

III. NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT HAS YET RULED ON THE MERITS OF
THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUE

*6 K 24 The Madsens do not make any attempt to counter
WAMU's federal preemption argument on the merits.
Instead, their argument on appeal consists entirely of an
assertion that the federal preemption issue has already
been decided by this court in Madsen I and by the Tenth
Circuit in Madsen //.But our opinion in Madsen I did not
address, much less decide, the issue of federal preemption.
And in Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case
purely for lack of federal jurisdiction. As we did not rule
on the merits of WAMU's federal preemption argument in
Madsen I, and as the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case for
lack ofjurisdiction without reaching the merits in Madsen
II, we now address for the first time the merits of
WAMU's federal preemption argument.

A. We Did Not Rule on the Merits of Federal
Preemption in Madsen I

% 25 The issue of preemption was not before us in Madsen
I.™29 The district court had ruled that neither the contract
nor the principles of pledge gave rise to a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The district court did not
rule on the issue of preemption. Accordingly, neither party
appealed the issue of federal preemption. Our decision in
Madsen I focused exclusively on whether the Madsens'
budget payments satisfied the elements of a common law
pledge.^We reversed the district court's ruling, holding
that the budget payments met the elements of a common
law pledge because there was "a debt or obligation, a
transfer of property to the pledgee, to be held as security
and, if necessary, to be used to assure performance of the
obligation."—The decision did not include a single
reference to any federal law, much less a resolution of
whether federal law preempts the Madsens1 accounting
claim.

® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

P.3d --P.3d

--•

Page 8
2008 WL 4299622 (Utah), 2008 UT 69

FN29.558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977).

FN30.M

FN33.5ee, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson. 2008 UT
24,11 10n.8, 182P.3d353 (declining to apply
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to a child
custody dispute because the parties did not argue
or brief the issue under that law).

FN31Jtf.atl339.

% 26 The Madsens' argue that, although they did not
appeal the issue of preemption and neither our opinion nor
the district court's grant of summary judgment addressed
preemption, "Prudential's federal theory has already been
presented to the Utah Supreme Court" and that "[i]f 12
C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) destroyed Madsen's [sic] cause of
action, the Utah Supreme Court would have been forced
to affirm the trial court's dismissal over thirty years
ago/This assertion is contrary to our well-established
precedent that "an appellate courtnay affirm the judgment
appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record.' " — When reviewing a
decision made on one ground, we have the discretion to
affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is
apparent in the record. But that cannot mean, as the
Madsens' contend here, that our declining to rule on an
alternative ground can be construed as a ruling on the
merits of the alternative ground, particularly when the
alternative ground has not been argued by either party to
the appeal. In fact, we frequently decline to rule on an
issue when it has not been fully briefed by the parties
because full briefing allows this court to carefully consider
fully developed and supported argumentsP^The decision
not to reach an alternative ground is certainly not binding
on the court below, particularly when the parties did not
argue the issue and this court's decision does not include
so much as a single reference to the issue now supposedly
foreclosed.

FN32.P/wmfl v. McPhie. 2001 UT 6L If 18. 29
P.3d 1225 (emphasis added) (quoting Limb v.
Federated Milk Producers Ass% 461 P.2d 290,
293 n. 2 (Utah 1969)).

*7 K 27 In support of their argument that we have already
ruled on the issue of preemption, the Madsens assert that
Prudential made the federal preemption argument in its
briefs. In fact, Prudential's appellate brief in Madsen I
cited federal banking regulations, including 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-11(c) in support of its policy argument against
applying the law ofpledge. But Prudential did not mention
the law of federal preemption. The Madsens' briefs in that
appeal likewise did not argue preemption. Thus the
Madsens are incorrect in arguing that we have already
decided the preemption issue. Having determined that we
did not decide the issue in Madsen I, we now address the
Madsens' contention that the Tenth Circuit decided the
preemption issue in Madsen II

B. The Tenth Circuit Did Not Rule on the Merits of
Federal Preemption In Madsen II

% 28 In Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the Madsens'
appeal from the federal district court, which had granted
summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the basis of
preemption:

Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens have
no claim against Prudential for interest on their escrow
account. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) clearly precludes the
relief the Madsens are seeking.... More importantly, the
regulation cited above does not appear to alter the
federal law applicable to loans made before June 16,
1975, but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of JL2
C.F.R. §§ 544.1 ("association is not required to
distribute earnings on short-term savings accounts") and
541.5 (defining short-term savings account as including
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mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and
insurance).—

FN34.635 F.2d 797, 800 (10th Cir.1980).

The Madsens argued that the federal court lacked
jurisdiction and appealed to the Tenth Circuit.^^The
issue on appeal was whether the federal court had federal
question jurisdiction, specifically whether the suit arose
under the Constitution or laws of the United States ~^The
Tenth Circuit held that federal jurisdiction existed only if
the "federalrightor immunity [is] an essential element of
the plaintiffs cause of action, and that the federal
controversy must be 'disclosed on the face of the
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for
removal.' " — It went on to hold that "[bjecause the
Madsens have predicated their suit upon rights created
under state law, the fact that federal regulations may
create a defense to recovery on such a claim is immaterial
to a finding of federal question jurisdiction." —

Here, it is vigorously argued that application of state
law would create a significant conflict because federal
policy requires uniform nationwide standards for the
handling of escrow accounts by federal savings and loan
associations. This argument founders on the very
language of the regulation cited to support it. Section
545.6-11(c) provides that a federal savings and loan
association shall pay interest on escrow accounts if a
state statute requires such payments to be made by
state-chartered institutions, or if payments are required
by contract. The regulation expressly anticipates that the
obligation of a federal institution to pay interest on
escrow accounts not only will vary from state to state,
butfromcontract to contract.

*8 ...

Given the absence of a significant conflict between the
federal policy expressed in section 545.6-11(c) and the
use of state law, we hold that state law is applicable in
determining whether Prudential contracted to pay
interest on the Madsens' escrow account—^

FN35.W.
FN39.A/. at 802-03 (emphasis added).
FN36./rf.
% 30 This, the Madsens argue, is the Tenth Circuit's
FN37.M (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank. 299 pronouncement that the federal regulation does not
U.S. 109. 113(1936)).
conflict with their claim for interest, and thus federal law
does not preempt their state law claim.
FN38.W. at 801.

K 29 Although the Tenth Circuit explicitly ruled on
jurisdictional grounds, the Madsens argue that the
following language in the Tenth Circuit's opinion
constitutes a decision on the merits of the preemption
argument:

K 31 The Madsens are incorrect. The discussion cited
above is presented in response to Prudential's argument
that the controversy required the court to apply federal
common law in determining whether the parties had
entered into a contract for the payment of interest. A
controversy that requires the application of federal
common law necessarily arises under the laws of the
United States. But federal courts only apply federal
common law to cases in which there is "a significant
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conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
CONCLUSION
use of state law." i ^The passage cited by the Madsens is
the Tenth Circuit's acknowledgment that under the explicit
terms of 21 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c), lenders' interest T[ 34 We conclude that federal law preempts the Madsens'
obligations could be varied by contract between private
claim for profits earned on pledged funds in reserve
parties. The question of whether such a private contract
accounts maintained by Prudential in connection with their
had been created is, as the Tenth Circuit concluded,
real estate mortgage. Because federal law preempts the
Madsens' cause of action, it is unnecessary to reach the
governed by state law. Interest obligations that varied
other issues presented by the parties in this appeal. We
from state to state or from contract to contract would not
reverse and remand with instructions to enter summary
disrupt a federal scheme requiring uniformity.
judgment in favor of WAMU.
VK40. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.. 384
U.S. 63. 68(1966).

T| 32 In this case, however, the Madsens have not claimed
that a provision in the contract obligated Prudential to pay
interest. Indeed, there is no such provision. Moreover,
they concede that there is no applicable state statute. So
while the federal regulation explicitly permits the interest
obligation to vary by private contract or by state statute, in
this case we have neither. And in the absence of a contract
or statute, the regulation is clear that Prudential had no
obligation to pay interest. The mere fact that the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that under the explicit terms of the
regulation, the interest obligation may be established by
private contract or statute in no way changes the fact that
absent either, Prudential had no obligation to pay interest
on the budget payment accounts.

K 35 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, Judge
GREENWOOD, and Judge WESTFALL concur in
Associate Chief Justice DURRANTS opinion.
K 36 Having disqualified himself, Justice WILKINS does
not participate herein; District Court Judge G. MICHAEL
WESTFALL sat.
K 37 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein; Court
of Appeals Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD sat.
Utah,2008.
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END OF DOCUMENT

f 33 Thus the Madsens are incorrect in arguing that this
court or the Tenth Circuit has already decided the
preemption issue, and it is appropriate that we resolve the
issue in this appeal. For the reasons discussed in section
II, we reverse the district court's ruling, hold that federal
law preempts the Madsens' accounting claim, and remand
with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of
WAMU. Because we decide that federal law preempts the
Madsens' claim, it is unnecessary to reach the other issues
in this appeal.
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